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Tank Tech Talks | Issue 6

ISSUE 6 • FEBRUARY 2025 
CATEGORY: ELECTRONIC WARFARE
 

Dean Wurzell
Senior Technical Program Manager 
National Advanced Mobility Consortium (NAMC)

 

Executive Summary

Modern doctrine assumes we can outmaneuver our adversaries through superior connectivity. Faster networks, richer sensors, better decisions. But every transmission is a signature, and signatures can get people killed. This issue looks at how open-source data patterns are becoming an increasingly relevant intelligence tool, why constant connectivity is a growing liability in a near-peer fight, and what a handful of students with internet access revealed that multiple intelligence agencies either couldn't or wouldn't.

 

Feature Story

Spectrum Literacy

An Opinion from your “local” Senior Technical Program Manager

Welcome back. Hope the New Year is treating everyone well. We're revamping the visual layout a bit, so bear with me while I sort that out. I have a bad habit of spending more time tweaking designs than actually writing, a character flaw I've made peace with. 

I usually spend a few hours each week catching up with old Marine Corps buddies, which inevitably turns into conversations about tech trends, defense topics, or whatever geopolitical fire is burning that week. Riveting, I know. That's what happens when you put a group of washed up Signals Intelligence nerds in a room.

Recently the conversation landed on special operations and irregular warfare, and specifically whether existing technological doctrine is becoming a liability rather than an advantage. Many are attempting to conceal a digital profile that the world is actively trying to read. In a near-peer fight, if you actually want to disappear on a modern battlefield, you're almost forced to go backward. The individual with a map, compass, and a weapon leaves almost no digital trace as they move through their area of operations.

That might sound extreme. But there is so much data being broadcast at any given moment that obscuring your activities from someone with an internet connection and Google, let alone a state actor with dedicated collection assets, is getting harder by the year. The irony is that we spent decades building faster, denser, more connected networks to accelerate information sharing and decision-making. Now we're trying to figure out how to become ghosts inside the same systems we built. Staying invisible is difficult when the infrastructure of modern warfare is designed to make everything visible.

Seven Students and a Shadow Fleet 

Most people probably caught at least a few headlines throughout 2025 about unidentified drones appearing over critical infrastructure across Europe. Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office recorded more than 1,000 suspicious drone incidents throughout the year. Between May 17 and 21 alone, 80 drone sightings were logged above German military installations. Government agencies and intelligence organizations failed to publicly identify the source. So seven college journalism students decided to do it themselves, using publicly available Open Source Intelligence resources and signals data. 

Stay with me here, this ties everything together… 

When ships transit the globe, they typically use an Automatic Identification System (AIS). It's an automated tracking system that continuously broadcasts a vessel's identity, position, speed, and course using a radio transceiver, GPS, and onboard sensors. The ocean is chaos and nobody is using their blinkers out there. AIS exists primarily for collision avoidance and maritime situational awareness, and the data it generates is mostly public. Because the drone activity was concentrated near multiple sensitive infrastructure sites, our protagonists decided to look for anomalies in shipping patterns rather than the drones themselves. They analyzed thousands of shipping movements in the North Sea and Baltic Sea and identified cargo vessels displaying strange behavior. Ships were spending days loitering near government infrastructure with no clear destination or schedule. Typically, when you transport goods, you want to get to your destination as quickly as possible. Coincidentally, all identified ships happened to be Russian linked. 

That probably doesn't matter though.

Their conclusion was that Russia's shadow fleet was being used as mobile drone launch platforms. Ships would loiter near target areas, deploy drones to collect intelligence on positions, training pipelines, and logistics movements, then quietly slip away. The full story reads like a Scooby-Doo episode, right down to the part where the meddling kids solved what intelligence agencies publicly couldn't.

Worth being clear though. The data was always there. Publicly available, sitting in maritime tracking systems, waiting for someone to look at it systematically. Nobody hid it. The pattern was just ignored, or at least not prioritized, until a group of students decided it was worth a few weeks of their time. Patterns are harder to hide than people think, and the same logic applies the moment you put a military formation in the field.
When both sides have a rough sense of each other's positions, masking your signature becomes a serious problem. Everything generates data now, including acoustic sensors, seismic sensors, infrared and thermal imaging, and radio frequency emissions. The same technological capability that makes a modern force lethal is the same capability that makes it visible.

 

Going Dark (Or at Least Quieter)

There are a few paths through this. Strip the adversary's technical collection advantage, strip your own technology usage, actively mask your own digital footprint, or move fast enough (physically or digitally) that any intelligence gathered on your systems is obsolete by the time it's actionable. That last option requires maintaining a pace of technological change that outruns your adversary's ability to analyze what they're seeing. It's less about secrecy and more about tempo. By the time they've mapped your architecture, you've already changed it. Defense planning has spent decades, and rightly so, building a connected and sensor-rich military designed to share information and make decisions faster than the other side. That doctrine has merit. But in the contested forests of Eastern Europe or the littorals of the Pacific, that same connectivity can become a liability. The radio that lets you call for fire support is also a beacon for an artillery strike with your name on it. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis Taylor touches on this in his publication The Coming Blitzkrieg, arguing that the answer lies in agility. Just as those Russian ships were exposed because their data pattern was static and predictable, armored formations are currently exposed targets in the electromagnetic spectrum for exactly the same reason. Taylor calls for "spectrum literacy, " a concept where commanders treat the electromagnetic spectrum like physical terrain they have to maneuver through. It requires changing waveforms, suppressing communications, and deliberately engineering your signature to blend into background noise.


The Royal United Services Institute made a related point in a recent analysis of electromagnetic operations in Ukraine, noting that future conflicts will be fought across overlapping dimensions where information dominance, technological integration, and doctrinal flexibility carry as much weight as raw firepower. Every tool that makes a force more capable also makes it more findable, and the students who traced a shadow fleet through public maritime data are a pretty good case study in what that looks like when someone is paying attention. The question isn't whether to use the technology. It's whether the people using it understand what it costs them when they do.

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